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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board,
Meet the Constitution
David S. Welkowitz*
For many years, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has refused to address constitutional claims raised in the course of registration
or cancellation proceedings. A recent example involves the Washington
Redskins trademark, which is the subject of a cancellation proceeding
now before a U.S. Court of Appeals. The Board’s refusal to address constitutional issues rests on the assumption that the Board lacks the authority to make constitutional decisions. That may seem odd, given the
fact that the Board is an arm of the federal government, and its members
are bound to uphold the Constitution. This Article examines the basis of
the Board’s claim of incapacity. Although the Board’s claim is not without precedent, it is argued that the better reading of current law is that
the Board does have the capacity to address constitutional claims and
that it should do so. The Article further examines ways in which the
Board can decide constitutional issues without overstepping its bounds as
an administrative agency. In particular, the Article examines the possible use of a familiar constitutional principle of avoidance as a means of
allowing the Board to incorporate constitutional principles into its decision-making without having to rule on the constitutionality of the provisions of the federal trademark statute.
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INTRODUCTION
The Washington Redskins mark has been the subject of controversy and cancellation proceedings for more than two decades.1
Twice, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the “TTAB” or
“Board”), an administrative tribunal within the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), has canceled the mark’s
registration on the grounds that it violated the prohibition on registering disparaging trademarks contained in the federal trademark
law.2 Both times, the football team claimed that cancellation would
1

See Theresa Vargas, U.S. Patent Office Cancels Redskins Trademark Registration, Says
Name Is Disparaging, WASH. POST (June 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/us-patent-office-cancels-redskins-trademark-registration-says-name-is-disparaging/
2014/06/18/e7737bb8-f6ee-11e3-8aa9-dad2ec039789_story.html
[https://perma.cc/
JNN3-HCXD].
2
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d, 284 F. Supp.
2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003). The TTAB canceled the registration of Redskins, but a district
court later reversed that decision. See id. The registration was again canceled in
Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014), aff’d, 112 F.
Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015). The
provision preventing the registration of disparaging marks is contained in section 2(a) of
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violate its First Amendment rights.3 And, both times, the response
from the TTAB—an arm of the government—was essentially the
same: “Such a finding [of a First Amendment violation] is beyond
the Board’s authority to make.”4 Regardless of the merits of the
team’s First Amendment claims, the TTAB’s response—
essentially saying it is not capable of applying the U.S. Constitution
to the issue of registration—is a strange one. 5 Moreover, it is one
that the TTAB has given on several occasions, and not just in First
Amendment situations.6 This Article contends that the TTAB,
clearly a governmental actor,7 is incorrect to ignore constitutional
restraints on government action. Even assuming that, as an administrative agency and not an Article III court, the Board cannot formally declare a federal law unconstitutional, as an arm of the federal government it is empowered to determine whether its actions
comport with the Constitution, and it ought to do so. This Article
the Lanham Act (the federal trademark law), which is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012).
The relevant portion of the statute states:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on
the principal register on account of its nature unless it—
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous
matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with
persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring
them into contempt, or disrepute . . . .
§ 1052(a) (emphasis added). As discussed later, subsequent to the district court’s
decision in Blackhorse, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the
prohibition against disparaging marks in section 2(a) was unconstitutional on its face. In re
Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30
(2016). However, the appeal of Blackhorse will be decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, not the Federal Circuit.
3
See Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1633, 1638 (T.T.A.B. 2011);
Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1710.
4
Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828, 1832–33 (T.T.A.B. 1994). Here, the
Board struck the football team’s First Amendment defenses from its answer, interpreting
the First Amendment defense as a request to declare section 2(a) of the Lanham Act
unconstitutional and beyond the Board’s authority. See id. A similar result occurred in
Blackhorse. See 98 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1638 (noting that the TTAB lacks authority to address
facial and as-applied constitutional challenges).
5
See Blackhorse, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1638; Harjo, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1832–33.
6
See infra Part I.
7
See generally Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/trademark-trial-andappeal-board-ttab [https://perma.cc/RQQ2-JZN5] (last visited Nov. 4, 2016).
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seeks to demonstrate why and how the TTAB should meet this
commitment. Part I reviews cases in which the TTAB has refused
to entertain constitutional arguments. Part II considers the authority of non-judicial governmental officials to apply the Constitution
to their actions. Part III offers a framework in which the TTAB can
entertain constitutional arguments without the need to declare laws
unconstitutional. Part III relies partially on well-established norms
of avoiding constitutional problems by preliminarily addressing
them and then acting in a manner that avoids the potential constitutional issue.
It is important to note that it is not this Article’s purpose to resolve the underlying constitutional issues themselves—particularly
the First Amendment issues.8 This Article’s goal is simply to demonstrate that the TTAB ought to address them in registration proceedings, subject to proper review by the courts.
I. THE TTAB’S REFUSAL TO ADDRESS CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES
In several recent cases, including Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc.,9
the TTAB has refused to consider the argument that the application of the Lanham Act, in particular cases, would violate the Constitution.10 The most notable of these cases involves First Amendment challenges to the Lanham Act’s bar to registration on the
grounds that the proposed mark is immoral, scandalous, or disparaging.11 Thus, in Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., the second case
challenging the Redskins trademark, the Board struck down several
affirmative defenses raising constitutional issues, stating: “Simply
put the Board does not have the authority to determine constitutional claims.”12

8

However, this Article offers some comments about those issues in passing.
50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003).
10
Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
11
Id.
12
98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1633, 1638 (T.T.A.B. 2011). The Board specifically referenced both
facial and as-applied challenges. Id.
9

2017]

TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

513

Similarly, in the case In re Brunetti,13 where the TTAB refused
the registration of the term “Fuct” under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act on the grounds that it was scandalous or immoral, the
Board rather forcefully refused to entertain a First Amendment
argument:
Finally, we readily recognize the statutory limitations of this tribunal. It is abundantly clear that the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board is not the appropriate forum for re-evaluating the impacts of any
evolving First Amendment jurisprudence within Article III courts upon determinations under [s]ection
2(a) of the Lanham Act, or for answering the Constitutional arguments of legal commentators or blog
critics.14
The TTAB’s refusals to engage in constitutional applications
are not limited to First Amendment claims. In the case In re The
Government of the District of Columbia, the Board refused to rule on
an argument that section 2(b) of the Lanham Act—which prevented a city from registering its municipal seal as a trademark—
was a violation of equal protection.15 Additionally, in Zirco Corp. v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,16 the TTAB refused to entertain an argument that applying the constructive use provision of

13

Brunetti, No. 85310960, 2014 WL 3976439, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2014), appeal
docketed, No. 15-1109 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 28, 2014).
14
Id. at *5. The Brunetti case is currently on appeal to the Federal Circuit. As
mentioned above, and discussed in more detail below, the Federal Circuit has already
ruled that section 2(a) is unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits the registration of marks
that may be disparaging. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub
nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). The Justice Department, acting in conjunction
with the USPTO, has notified the Federal Circuit in the Brunetti case that, despite
disagreeing with the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, it would nevertheless make the section
2(a) prohibition on registering scandalous or immoral marks—the basis for the refusal in
Brunetti—unconstitutional as well. Letter Brief for U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office at 2, In re Brunetti, No. 15-1109 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 21, 2016) [hereinafter
Letter Brief].
15
101 U.S.P.Q.2d 1588, 1602 (T.T.A.B. 2012) (“[W]e cannot rule on applicant’s
constitutional arguments.”). The TTAB did, however, respond to the merits in a
footnote, citing Federal Circuit precedent. See id. at 1602 n.24.
16
21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1542 (T.T.A.B. 1991).
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the Lanham Act17 to an intent-to-use application prior to actual use
and registration violates the Commerce Clause.18 Moreover, the
Board does not distinguish between as-applied and facial constitutional claims.19 In Harjo, the football team argued that it was not
asking the Board to declare the statute unconstitutional, but only to
apply it in a constitutional manner. However, the TTAB rejected
this argument, largely reiterating its previous rationale.20
On rare occasions, the Board will, in passing, address the Constitution. In Research in Motion Limited v. Defining Presence Marketing Group, Inc., the applicant claimed that its proposed mark,
Crackberry, was a parody of the Blackberry mark.21 The Board peremptorily dismissed this argument:
Furthermore, when federal courts are dealing with
questions of alleged infringement, the protective
penumbra of free speech may well support the pre17

See Lanham Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2012). This provision deems the
applicant’s first use, and thus its priority in the mark, to be the earlier of its first actual use
or the date of the filing of the application to register. Id. Effectively, this means that
someone applying before actual use (based on intent to use the mark) can claim priority
dating back to its application filing date. However, the constructive use provision by its
terms only applies if the applicant is successful in obtaining a registration, which requires
actual use at some point.
18
See Zirco Corp., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1544; cf. adidas AG v. Christian Faith Fellowship
Church, No. 92053314, 2015 WL 5882313 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 14, 2015), rev’d, 841 F.3d 986
(Fed. Cir. 2016). In a non-precedential case, the Board discussed case law relating to the
constitutional standard of commerce and asserted that the applicant’s use “does not
affect commerce that Congress can regulate such that the transaction would constitute
use in commerce for purposes of registration.” adidas, 2015 WL 5882313, at *7. Although
the case did not address a constitutional challenge to the legislation or its application, this
case at least indirectly addresses constitutional issues by referring to the interpretation of
the interstate commerce standard. See id. On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the
registrant’s activity was a “use in commerce” under the Lanham Act and reversed the
Board’s cancellation of the mark. Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. adidas AG, 841
F.3d 986, 990–95 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
19
See Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1710 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d,
284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003).
20
See id. at 1710 (“[W]e find such arguments unpersuasive, as the Board has no
authority to determine, either generally or with respect to respondent, whether [s]ection
2(a) is overbroad or vague, or to declare provisions of the Trademark Act
unconstitutional.”).
21
102 U.S.P.Q.2d 1187, 1191 (T.T.A.B. 2012). Apparently, users of Blackberrys often
were thought to be addicted to their devices, leading to widespread use of the term
“Crackberry” for Blackberry devices. See id.
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mise that members of the public have a right to use
words in the English language to interest and amuse
other persons. However, when this Board is asked
the narrower question of applicants’ right to registration under [s]ection 2(d) of the Lanham Act
[which bars registration if the applicant’s mark
would cause confusion with an existing mark], the
First Amendment claim is not as strong as with issues of restraint on use. The center of balance
changes even further when the risk of confusion of
source, affiliation, approval, or endorsement by the
source of the known expression outweighs the newcomer’s claim to the right to adopt and register a
humorous moniker.22
Although the Board gave short shrift to the argument, it is
noteworthy that the Board thought to mention the First Amendment in a manner that appeared to concede its possible application
in a registration proceeding.23 However, the applicant did not actually raise a constitutional defense, as opposed to merely asserting
that parodies obviate the likelihood of confusion.24 Thus, the Board
was not asked to decide a constitutional question, so it did not do
so.25
The TTAB’s rationale for ignoring these arguments is that, as
an administrative tribunal, it lacks the power to declare the statute
unconstitutional.26 This stance is, on its face, a curious one. The
TTAB, a tribunal of the USPTO, which itself is within the Department of Commerce, is part of the federal government.27 Its ac22

Id. at 1191–92.
See id.
24
See Applicants’ Second Amended Trial Brief at 14–21, Research in Motion, Ltd. v.
Defining Presence Mktg. Grp., Inc., 102 U.S.P.Q.2d 1187 (T.T.A.B. 2012), 2011 WL
8609564.
25
The Board’s discussion in Research in Motion mirrors its general position that refused
applications do not inhibit use and therefore do not implicate the First Amendment. See
Pro-Football Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 452 (E.D. Va. 2015), appeal docketed,
No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015). But cf. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1339–43, 1345–46
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (rejecting this assertion), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30
(2016).
26
TBMP § 102.01 (Jan. 2017).
27
See id.
23
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tions are governmental actions.28 The TTAB’s administrative
judges are officers of the United States—they are appointed by the
Secretary of Commerce, the head of the department for which they
work.29 The tribunal is clearly bound by the limitations of the Constitution,30 as are its constituent officers.31 Indeed, one can appeal
TTAB decisions to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or
a U.S. district court, either of which will at least entertain a constitutional challenge to the TTAB’s decision.32 Moreover, as the next
section discusses, the TTAB’s stance seems out of step with that
of other non-judicial branches of the government, which do consider the constitutionality of their actions.
The problem with the TTAB’s position can be illustrated with
a simple, if extreme (and unrealistic) hypothetical: Suppose Congress were to amend the Lanham Act and bar women (on behalf of
themselves, or other entities, such as corporations) from registering trademarks. Using the TTAB’s philosophy, the Board would
refuse to allow a woman to register a trademark. An appeal would
certainly succeed, with a declaration that the prohibition is unconstitutional. But it would require a waste of resources, both judicial
and monetary. This hypothetical does present a conundrum for the
TTAB. To prevent an obvious constitutional violation would actually require the Board to declare a part of the statute unconstitutional (or at least to refuse to follow it). Perhaps the Board would
be unwilling to go that far. On the other hand, as discussed below,
other executive branch officials have not been so timid.

28

Id.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (declaring that Congress may vest appointment power of
officers of the United States in heads of departments); 15 U.S.C. § 1067(b) (2012) (stating
that the Secretary of Commerce appoints administrative trademark judges).
30
See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1321. At the very least, this is the implication of the
Federal Circuit’s decision in Tam, in which the court declared unconstitutional the
portion of section 2(a) of the Lanham Act that bars registration of disparaging marks. See
id.
31
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[A]ll executive and judicial officers, both of the
United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support
this Constitution.”).
32
See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1321, 1358; Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp.
3d 439, 454–56 (E.D. Va. 2015) (discussing, but rejecting, First Amendment challenges),
appeal docketed, No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015).
29
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There is, in fact, a provision of the Lanham Act that could raise
this kind of issue. Section 2(c) bars the unconsented registration of
the “name, signature, or portrait of a deceased President of the
United States during the life of his widow.”33 What happens if the
President is a woman? Her husband would be a widower, not a widow. Clearly, applying the statute literally would violate the Equal
Protection Clause.34
Consider then another hypothetical: Suppose Congress were to
amend section 2(a) of the Lanham Act to bar registration of any
trademark that “promotes lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender
lifestyles including, but not limited to, same-sex marriage.” Such a
viewpoint-based prohibition would appear to be a clear First
Amendment violation.35 Yet, the Board’s methodology would require it to ignore the First Amendment issue and only ask whether
the proposed mark fits within the statutory prohibition.
The TTAB appears to assert its position as a lack of authority.
As the next section discusses, although the case law is somewhat
muddled on this point, the TTAB’s position seems to be an unnecessarily extreme, and possibly incorrect, reading of the cases and
of the Board’s authority.

33

Lanham Act § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) (2012).
A president in a same-sex marriage would lead to analogous issues, although
somewhat in reverse. A male president’s spouse presumably would be deemed a widower,
not a widow, while a female president’s spouse would be a widow.
35
See, e.g., In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1339–43, 1345–48 (rejecting both contentions and
holding section 2(a) of the Lanham Act unconstitutional insofar as it applies to
disparaging marks). The counter to this conclusion might be the approach of the district
court in Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse. See 112 F. Supp. 3d at 439. In Blackhorse, the court
held that registration constitutes government speech and therefore the statute could
prevent the expression of disfavored viewpoints. Id. at 457–58. The court also held that,
because a refusal to register does not bar actual use, there is no First Amendment
problem. Id. at 455–57. The Supreme Court is set to resolve these issues when it decides
the Tam case. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1355–57. As of this writing, it is unclear whether
the Fourth Circuit will choose to rule on the issue before the Supreme Court issues its
ruling.
34
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II. THE AUTHORITY OF NON-JUDICIAL GOVERNMENTAL
ENTITIES TO CONSTRUE THE CONSTITUTION
A. The Jurisprudence of Agency Competence to Address Constitutional
Issues
It might seem obvious that a federal agency must have the authority to interpret and apply federal constitutional principles to its
actions.36 After all, federal trademark judges are officers of the
United States,37 and, as such, take an oath to uphold the Constitution. However, case law has created a web of uncertainty around
this issue.
The TTAB’s position seems based on the principle that it lacks
the authority to challenge the constitutionality of the trademark
statute.38 That principle finds support in some case law.39 The
most notable decision is probably Johnson v. Robison, where the Supreme Court stated: “[T]he principle that ‘[a]djudication of the
constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been
thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies.’”40
However, the Court did not explain why this would be so, and the
cases cited in the Court’s opinion to support the principle are not
necessarily on point with regard to the authority of the TTAB.41
One of those cases is Oestereich v. Selective Services Board, where
36

One might say the same of a state agency. Interestingly, however, some state
agencies are barred by state law from considering constitutional challenges. See, e.g., CAL.
CONST. art. III, § 3.5 (barring state agencies from refusing to enforce a statute on state or
federal constitutional grounds (or federal statutory grounds) unless an appellate court has
ruled that the statute is unenforceable or unconstitutional). For a discussion of state
agency competence to decide constitutional issues, see generally Katherine Shaw, State
Administrative Constitutionalism, 69 ARK. L. REV. 527 (2016).
37
See 15 U.S.C. § 1067(b) (2012).
38
TBMP § 102.01 (Jan. 2017) (stating that the Board, as an administrative tribunal, has
no authority to declare laws unconstitutional).
39
A law review note from almost forty years ago calls it “traditional wisdom” that
agencies could not pass on the constitutionality of statutes. Note, The Authority of
Administrative Agencies to Consider the Constitutionality of Statutes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1682,
1684 (1977). However, more recent scholarship indicates that agencies frequently
interpret the Constitution. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism,
91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1897–98 (2013).
40
415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974) (quoting Oestereich v. Selective Servs. Bd., 393 U.S. 233,
242 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
41
See id.
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Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion set forth specific reasons why
it would be inappropriate for Selective Services Boards to pass on
the constitutionality of the governing statute:
[T]he composition of the boards, and their administrative procedures, render them wholly unsuitable
forums for the adjudication of matters: local and appeal Boards consist of part-time, uncompensated
members, chosen ideally to be representative of the
registrants’ communities; the fact that a registrant
may not be represented by counsel in Selective Service proceedings seems incompatible with the
Boards’ serious consideration of such purely legal
claims.42
None of those deficiencies plague the TTAB. Its members are
lawyers—experts in their fields—and presumably at ease with constitutional concepts. Parties appearing before the Board may (and
usually do) have counsel. Although TTAB proceedings are not
formal adjudicatory hearings before an administrative law judge, its
proceedings do emulate court proceedings—they use the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence wherever possible,43 and
their factual findings may be given preclusive effect by Article III
courts.44
Another case cited in Johnson (taken from Justice Harlan’s
opinion in Oesterich) is Public Utilities Commission v. United States,
where the main issue was the ability of the United States to bypass
California’s administrative process and seek declaratory relief from
a court as to its claims of preemption of state rules.45 Thus, the
Court’s implications about the California agency’s ability or willingness to entertain a constitutional challenge must be viewed in
that context. Moreover, the California Constitution specifically
prohibits state agencies from ruling on constitutional challenges to
42

393 U.S. 233, 242–43 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
See TBMP § 101.02 (Jan. 2017) (citing 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.116, 2.122(a) (2016))
(describing use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence in
inter partes proceedings). The TTAB Manual of Procedure also notes that the Federal
Rules of Evidence are usually applied in ex parte appeals to the Board. See id.
44
B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).
45
355 U.S. 534, 539–40 (1958).
43
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the enforcement of the agency’s statutory directives.46 The TTAB
is a federal agency and there is no express statutory or constitutional bar to its examining constitutional arguments. Additionally,
the job of the TTAB is somewhat different than the Public Utilities
Commission—it is not regulatory in the same manner.47
The sweeping principle enunciated in Johnson is not well supported by the case law on which it relies, nor on the facts of the
case itself. Nowhere does the Court justify such a principle by an
appeal to a constitutional limitation, either express or implied.
Moreover, in Johnson, the precise question was whether a statutory
bar to judicial review of Veterans Administration determinations
included a bar to judicial review of constitutional questions.48 The
Court, without expressly endorsing the Veterans Administration’s
refusal to entertain constitutional challenges, held that the statutory bar did not apply to constitutional questions.49 Thus, the thrust
of Johnson and Oestereich was the availability of judicial consideration of constitutional questions. The issue of agency authority was,
at best, incidental to the main issue. Furthermore, unlike the circumstances in Johnson and Oestereich, it is clear that Article III
judicial review of TTAB decisions is available.
In the subsequent case of Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, the
Supreme Court made it clear that Johnson should not be read as
endorsing a broad principle that agencies per se lack authority to
hear constitutional issues.50 The issue in Thunder Basin (analogous
to the other cases discussed above) was the availability of preenforcement review in a federal district court of a challenge to the
Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, without first
46

See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5(b).
See Eng’rs Pub. Serv. Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 138 F.2d 936, 952 (D.C. Cir.
1943), vacated as moot, 332 U.S. 788 (1947) (parties jointly moved to vacate). This
decision, also cited in the Johnson opinion, noted that the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) refused to rule on the “constitutionality of the Act which it is
called upon to administer.” Id. However, the court remarked that agencies are sometimes
called upon to make rulings on factual issues, such as “interstate commerce,” that bear
on constitutional issues. Id. at 953. Moreover, as this Article discusses later, the SEC, at
least more recently, has addressed constitutional issues.
48
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366–67 (1974).
49
Id. at 367–74.
50
510 U.S. 200, 215 (1994).
47
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going through the agency process.51 In passing, the Court stated:
“[W]e agree that ‘[a]djudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies.’”52 However, the Court went
on to state the following: “This rule is not mandatory, however, and
is perhaps of less consequence where, as here, the reviewing body
is not the agency itself but an independent commission established
exclusively to adjudicate Mine Act disputes . . . . The Commission
has addressed constitutional questions in previous enforcement proceedings.”53
In Thunder Basin, the Court cited its decision in Califano v.
Sanders, which stated (without citation to authority): “Constitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and, therefore, access to the courts is essential to the decision of such questions.”54 But, as the quoted language makes clear, the focus of Califano was on the availability of
judicial review of the agency’s decision in an Article III court. (The
same issue was at the heart of Thunder Basin and the other cases
cited above as well.) Thus, “resolution” of constitutional questions
may well be best handled in full-fledged Article III courts, provided
that a party wishes to bring the case to those courts. But there is no
reason to preclude an agency, particularly one with primary jurisdiction, from addressing such questions in the first instance. That
may obviate the need for a party to seek redress in Article III
courts, saving judicial resources and party money. In fact, the
Court’s language in Thunder Basin makes it clear that agencies may
do just that.55 Moreover, since factual issues resolved by the TTAB
51

Id. at 202.
Id. (quoting Johnson, 415 U.S. at 368).
53
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
54
430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977) (emphasis added); see also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749
(1977). In Weinberger, the Court stated, in passing, that “once the Secretary has satisfied
himself that the only issue is the constitutionality of a statutory requirement, a matter
which is beyond his jurisdiction to determine . . . .” Weinberger, 422 U.S. 749 at 765. But
the Court cited no support for this proposition. Moreover, it was not essential to the
decision, which turned on an issue of proper judicial review.
55
See, e.g., Bonnichsen v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 969 F. Supp. 628, 650–51 (D. Or.
1997) (noting that Thunder Basin indicates that agencies may address constitutional
arguments and that, in any case, agencies may construe statutes to avoid constitutional
issues).
52

522

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVII:509

may now be deemed preclusive in subsequent proceedings in Article III courts, it is essential that they be made in the proper context, including the constitutional context.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Elgin v. Department of the
Treasury,56 which was decided after Thunder Basin, illustrates how
the issue of agency authority to interpret and apply the Constitution can become entangled with the issue of availability of review
by Article III courts, with concomitant confusion for the authority
issue.57 In Elgin, the plaintiffs wanted to challenge their dismissal
from their jobs by the Treasury Department because of their failure
to register with the Selective Service.58 They alleged that the dismissal violated the Equal Protection Clause (because only males
are subject to registration), and that the law mandating their dismissal constituted a bill of attainder.59 However, rather than use
the statutorily mandated administrative process for challenges to
personnel actions—a hearing before the Merit Systems Protection
Board (“MSPB”), with review available by the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit—the Elgin plaintiffs brought an action in
federal district court to adjudicate their claims.60 Chief among the
plaintiffs’ arguments in favor of district court power to hear the
action was that the MSPB lacked the authority to address their
constitutional claims, and that the Federal Circuit’s power was derivative of the MSPB, thereby depriving the appellate court of the
power to hear the claims.61 Although it disagreed with this argument—instead finding that the statute did not deprive the Federal
Circuit of authority to hear constitutional claims—the Supreme
Court did note that the MSPB does refuse to hear certain types of
constitutional claims.62 But the Court expressly declined to rule on
56

132 S. Ct. 2126 (2012).
See id.
58
Id. at 2129.
59
See id. at 2131. The bill of attainder argument was apparently a claim that the
statutory exclusion from employment legislatively punished men aged twenty-six and
older due to past conduct—i.e., not registering for Selective Service. See Elgin v. U.S.
Dep’t of Treasury, 641 F.3d 6, 18–20 (1st Cir. 2011) (Stahl, J., concurring), aff’d, 132 S.
Ct. 2126 (2012).
60
Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2132.
61
Id. at 2136–37.
62
Id. at 2136.
57
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the correctness of the MSPB’s refusal, since it was not necessary to
determine the issue at bar.63
The Court’s jurisprudence on the issue of agency competence
to address constitutional claims leaves much to be desired. However, it does appear to recognize the power of agencies to at least hear
and determine some kinds of constitutional arguments, particularly
where the agency’s determination is subject to review by an Article
III court.64
B. Agency Willingness to Address Constitutional Issues
Although the Supreme Court has been less than clear on this issue, the Court’s reticence to clarify the matter has not entirely deterred agencies and other non-judicial governmental actors from
63

See id.
In patent law, parties have challenged the reexamination procedures of the Patent
Office (and, lately, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, or PTAB) on the ground that,
among other things, patent cancellation requires an Article III court action and is subject
to a jury trial right under the Seventh Amendment. See TBMP § 102.01 (Jan. 2017)
(stating that the Board lacks jurisdiction to hear infringement or unfair competition
claims); see also Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 603–05 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(rejecting Article III and Seventh Amendment challenges to reexamination proceedings).
Thus far, these challenges have been rejected based, to a large degree, on a public versus
private rights distinction. See, e.g., Joy Techs. V. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226, 228–29 (Fed.
Cir. 1992). It is unclear whether trademark registrations should be treated like patents in
this regard. Although patents and trademarks are both forms of intellectual property
rights, a trademark registration, which is all that the TTAB oversees, is not the sole source
of trademark rights, which also derives from common law. Patents, on the other hand, are
granted only by the USPTO. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2012) (providing that the USPTO is
“responsible for granting and issuing of patents”). But, if the issue is whether trademark
registrations have independent value, the decision in Tam indicates that trademark
registrations should be regarded as valuable apart from the common law rights in a
trademark. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). Ascribing independent value to registrations tends to favor
viewing registrations as public rights, not requiring Article III courts to make decisions.
The Supreme Court’s decision in B & B Hardware v. Hargis Industries, Inc., allowing
preclusive use of TTAB findings, also suggests that the TTAB has sufficient status to be
treated as a kind of court—albeit an Article I court. See 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015); see also
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 852–53 (1986) (noting that
the Commodities Exchange Act gave the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
power in a limited area of law, with review by Article III courts, and upholding the
Commission’s power to hear a counterclaim raising only private rights). Like the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), the TTAB has jurisdiction over a
limited area of law. But, unlike the CFTC, the TTAB cannot exercise jurisdiction over
“private rights” counterclaims.
64
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addressing constitutional claims. In contrast to the TTAB, other
non-judicial arms of the government (i.e., agencies and Executive
Branch departments) regularly examine the constitutionality of
their actions.
The recent Supreme Court case Zivotofsky v. Kerry provides an
interesting example.65 Congress passed a law requiring the State
Department to allow people born in Jerusalem to put “Israel” as
their place of birth on their passports.66 However, both Presidents
George W. Bush and Barack Obama viewed the statute (which was
signed into law by President Bush) as an unconstitutional intrusion
on their power to conduct foreign affairs.67 Thus, when Zivotofsky’s parents invoked the statute and requested that his passport
state his place of birth as Israel, the State Department refused,
which led to a lawsuit.68 Although the Supreme Court ultimately
upheld the State Department’s position, it is the initial refusal that
is significant.69 The President and Secretary of State acted on their
own interpretation of the Constitution. Thus, an Executive Branch
department refused to apply a clearly applicable statute based on its
own determination that the statute was unconstitutional. Although
it took a Supreme Court decision to actually declare the statute unconstitutional, this did not prevent the State Department from acting on its own determination of constitutional power.70
Another interesting example is Matter of Compean, an interim
decision by the Attorney General.71 For a number of years, the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) analyzed claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in deportation proceedings according to a

65

135 S. Ct. 2076, 2078 (2015).
See id. at 2082 (discussing section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act).
67
Id. (noting the signing statement of President Bush); Steven D. Schwinn, Zivotofsky
v. Kerry: A Study in Law, Politics, and Foreign Affairs, 79 SOC. EDUC., no. 1, Jan./Feb.
2015, at 30, 32 (describing the Obama administration’s position that section 214(d)
“impermissibly interferes with the president’s exclusive power”).
68
See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2083.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2 (A.G. 2009). (Thank you to my colleague, Stewart Chang, who
pointed me to this decision.).
66
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framework established by the BIA in a 1988 decision.72 The BIA’s
framework was overruled by the Attorney General at the end of
President George W. Bush’s Administration on the ground that
there was no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel
in deportation proceedings.73 After President Obama took office,
the new Attorney General reviewed the Compean decision and reversed it (while directing the Executive Office for Immigration Review to institute rulemaking proceedings on the subject).74 For this
Article’s purposes, the back and forth between the Attorney General’s Office and the Bureau of Immigration Appeals illuminates
the issue posed by the TTAB’s position. The Board of Immigration
Appeals, a non-Article III tribunal, was willing to entertain (and
even on occasion uphold) a constitutional argument—ineffective
assistance of counsel—and even provided its own framework for
analyzing the issue. Two Attorney Generals—Executive Branch
officials—also addressed the issue, making their own constitutional
arguments (albeit both operating as reviewing officials of the BIA).
But, one might say, the BIA is operating in an almost criminal situation, namely deportation and removal proceedings. The stakes are
much different than a trademark registration—not that this really
should make it more appropriate as a matter of sheer power for one
agency to refuse to entertain constitutional arguments.
But quasi-criminal proceedings are not the only situations in
which agencies assert power to address constitutional issues. Other
agencies with quasi-judicial power, such as the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) and the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), do not shrink from addressing the constitutional
implications of their proceedings. One of the important functions
of the FTC is to police false and misleading advertising.75 Clearly,
this task implicates First Amendment concerns as it involves regulating the content of a form of speech: advertising. Although advertising may not always enjoy full First Amendment protection, it
72

See Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988), overruled by Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec.
1 (A.G. 2009).
73
Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 2.
74
Id.
75
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012) (giving the FTC the power to regulate “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices”); id. § 52 (prohibiting false advertising for “food, drugs,
devices, services, or cosmetics”).
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still can claim significant constitutional protection.76 The FTC is
empowered to bring quasi-judicial proceedings against those who
use false or misleading advertising.77 These proceedings reflect the
understanding that constitutional issues are implicit in such regulation. Forty years ago, in a case involving advertising for eggs, the
FTC recognized a constitutional distinction between pure commercial promotion and other forms of advertising:
These advertisements, [relating to health aspects of
eggs], do not carry the strong promotional message
concerning eggs that the other challenged advertisements convey. The principal thrust of CX 171173 is information concerning eggs and cholesterol,
a matter of public concern. CX 175-176 also seem to
fall in the category of advertisements concerned
primarily with conveying a message on matters of
public concern, including comment on governmental action. CX 171-173 and CX 175-176 were disseminated subsequent to issuance of the complaint
herein, and may warrant First Amendment protection. Accordingly, no finding of a violation of the
Federal Trade Commission Act is predicated on
these documents.78
In the same case, the Commission further addressed the constitutional aspects of the commercial/non-commercial divide.79
Ten years later, in an antitrust action against the District of Columbia Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, whose members
had refused to accept criminal defense appointments unless fees
were increased, the FTC addressed a defense that the lawyers’ ac-

76

See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–62 (1980).
77
See § 45(b).
78
Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 162–63 (1976) (citation omitted).
“CX 171-173” and the other numbered markers in the quoted paragraph refer to the ads
at issue in the case. See id.
79
Id. at 164–66 (addressing constitutional arguments and finding that other
advertisements were commercial speech and were not protected by the First
Amendment).
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tions constituted a constitutionally protected political boycott.80
Further evidence of the FTC’s strong belief in its ability to address
constitutional claims is provided by an interagency comment sent
by the FTC to the U.S. Mint.81 In that memorandum, the FTC
touted its experience applying the First Amendment to advertisements as evidence that the Mint should welcome its assistance in
promulgating regulations on the use of various words and symbols
by entities other than the Mint when they produce Mint-like products.82
The FCC’s regulatory actions similarly implicate First
Amendment concerns as they directly regulate communication via
broadcasting. And the FCC recognizes and addresses the constitutional implications of its regulation.83 In the case In re 21st Century
Fax(es) Ltd., the FCC imposed a fine for willful violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.84 The respondent argued
that the statute violated the First Amendment.85 The Commission,
noting that the Act had been upheld by federal courts, rejected the
constitutional argument.86 It further noted that “administrative
agencies are to presume that the statutes that Congress directs
them to implement are constitutional,”87 indicating that the Com80

Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 107 F.T.C. 510 (1986) (opinion by an
administrative law judge).
81
Staff of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, Bureau of Economics and the Office of
Policy Planning of the Federal Trade Commission, Comment on Assessment of Civil
Penalties for Misuse of Words, Letters, Symbols, and Emblems of the United States Mint
(Mar. 11, 2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_
documents/ftc-staff-comment-united-states-mint-concerning-civil-penalties-misusemint-words-letters-symbols/050315usmintcomment.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5VD-75VJ]
[hereinafter FTC Staff Comment].
82
See id. at 2–3 (discussing the FTC’s constitutional interpretations).
83
See, e.g., Rubber City Radio Grp., 17 FCC Rcd. 14745, 14745 (2002) (“The First
Amendment, however, is a critical constitutional limitation that demands we proceed
cautiously and with appropriate restraint.”). For a discussion of another example of the
FCC’s use of constitutional principles, see Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking:
Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799,
810–21 (2010) (discussing the FCC’s use of the state action doctrine).
84
17 FCC Rcd. 1384 (2002).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 1388.
87
Id. Interestingly, in making this statement, the FCC cited Johnson v. Robison and
quoted the portion of the case (from Oestereich) that seemed to deny agency power to hold
the statute unconstitutional. See id. at 1388 n.26 (citing 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974)).
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mission believed it had the authority to find the statute unconstitutional if the presumption was rebutted. In an earlier decision in the
case In re Application of WGBH Educational Foundation, which challenged the license renewal of WGBH-TV, the Commission stated:
“With regard to ‘indecent’ or ‘profane’ utterances, the First
Amendment and the ‘no censorship’ provision of [s]ection 326 of
the Communications Act severely limit any role by the Commission and the courts in enforcing the proscription contained in
[s]ection 1464.”88 The Commission went on to discuss the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,89 stating: “We believe that we should construe the Pacifica
holding consistent with the paramount importance we attach to
encouraging free-ranging programming and editorial discretion by
broadcasters.”90
Another agency whose decisions implicate constitutional issues
is the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The most
obvious constitutional issue for the SEC is the First Amendment,
which is relevant to the SEC’s disclosure requirements. However,
the SEC has also been willing to address more fundamental constitutional issues, such as questions that address the constitutionality
of its composition. In the Matter of Raymond J. Lucia Companies,
Inc., the target of an SEC proceeding challenged the agency’s internal quasi-judicial proceeding on the ground that the administrative law judge was not properly appointed in conformance with the
Appointments Clause of the Constitution.91 The Commission re88

69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254 (1978).
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
90
WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d at 1254; see also Rubber City Radio Grp., 17 FCC
Rcd. 14745, 14746 (2002) (The agency concluded that a radio station violated the
Commission’s indecency policy, stating: “The First Amendment, however, is a critical
constitutional limitation that demands we proceed cautiously and with appropriate
restraint.”). The FCC has noted, however, that its authority to hear constitutional issues
is discretionary, and it has sometimes declined to hear such claims outside of the First
Amendment context. See, e.g., WXTC License P’ship, G.P., 15 FCC Rcd. 692 (2000)
(declining to address argument that section 614 of the Communications Act is an
unconstitutional taking).
91
Exchange Act Release No. 75,837, Investment Advisors Release No. 4,190,
Investment Company Release No. 31,806, 112 SEC Docket 6 (Sept. 3, 2015), petition
denied, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), reh’g granted, vacated, 2017 WL 631744 (D.C. Cir.
Feb. 16, 2017).
89
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jected the argument on the merits.92 Moreover, the Commission
specifically alluded to its authority to address such fundamental
issues, and the desirability of its addressing the issues in the first
instance, prior to review by the courts.93 Furthermore, as its citations in Lucia made clear, the SEC is not shy about addressing constitutional issues in its proceedings.94 It has also been noted that
the Tax Court, from fairly early in the twentieth century, has ruled
on the constitutionality of statutes.95 Although other examples
could be given, these examples suffice to demonstrate that federal
agencies and federal non-judicial officials do not uniformly shy
away from addressing the constitutional issues implicit in their actions.
On the other hand, the TTAB is not alone in its reluctance to
adjudicate the constitutionality of its governing statutes. For example, in 2010, the Register of Copyrights was asked whether she, or a
copyright royalty judge, has the authority to adjudicate the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Copyright Act relating to the
use of settlements under the Webcaster Settlement Acts in proceedings before the Copyright Royalty Board. The Register responded that she was without such authority, citing the “general
rule” that agencies are without authority to adjudicate the constitutionality of their governing statutes.96 The Register cited the Supreme Court cases discussed above as the source of this “general
rule.”97
As indicated in Elgin, the MSPB takes a somewhat limited view
of its authority to address constitutional issues.98 This is further
illustrated in Bayly v. Office of Personnel Management, in which the
Office of Personnel Management refused to address appellant’s
contention that the statute (which “mandate[s] termination of survivor annuity benefits upon marriage prior to age 55”) constituted
92

Id.
Id.
94
Id. (citing rulings on double jeopardy and the Seventh Amendment).
95
Note, supra note 39, at 1687.
96
The Register of Copyrights’ and the Copyright Royalty Judges’ Authority to
Determine the Constitutionality of 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(5), 75 Fed. Reg. 26,278, 26,280
(May 11, 2010).
97
Id.
98
Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2133 (2012).
93
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a denial of equal protection.99 However, the MSPB made a point of
distinguishing the question presented in this case, which attacked
the statute itself, from the situation in which a party only questions
the constitutionality of the application of the statute.100 Thus, an asapplied challenge may be addressed, even if a facial challenge to the
statute would not. On the other hand, as demonstrated by the examples above, some agencies, such as the SEC, take the Court at its
word in Thunder Basin that agencies are not without authority to
address constitutional issues, even facial claims.101
The distinction between facial and as-applied challenges was
addressed by the District of Columbia Circuit in Continental Air
Lines, Inc. v. Department of Transportation.102 In a dispute relating to
the Department of Transportation’s interpretation of a statute, the
court stated:
[I]t cannot be gainsaid that, in carrying on its interpretive function, an agency must be mindful of the
higher demands of the Constitution. To be sure, the
Department is powerless to determine the constitutionality of the statute itself, as the Supreme Court
plainly held in Weinberger v. Salfi . . . . As we see it,
the agency was never given a shot at wrestling with
the statute in a way that, in the agency’s view,
would comport with the demands of the First
Amendment . . . .103
99

42 M.S.P.R. 524, 525 (M.S.P.B. 1990).
Id. (citing May v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 38 M.S.P.R. 534, 538 (M.S.P.B.
1988)); cf. Elgin v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 641 F.3d 6, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2011), (citing Bayly
for the proposition that the MSPB cannot “determine the constitutionality of [f]ederal
statutes,” but noting that constitutional claims arise frequently in agency personnel
discharge proceedings (quoting Bayly, 42 M.S.P.R. at 525–26)), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2126
(2012).
101
See, e.g., Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 75,837, Investment
Advisors Release No. 4,190, Investment Company Release No. 31,806, 112 SEC Docket 6
(Sept. 3, 2015), petition denied, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), reh’g granted, vacated, 2017
WL 631744 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017).
102
843 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
103
Id. at 1455–56 (citations omitted). It may be worth noting that in Weinberger v. Salfi,
the “plain” holding of the Court looks more like an aside (or two asides):
In the present case, the complaint seeks review of the denial of
benefits based on the plain wording of a statute which is alleged to be
100
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It seems clear that the D.C. Circuit assumed that an agency has
the power to determine whether a particular application of a statute
would comport with the Constitution, even if it might not have the
power to rule a statute unconstitutional on its face.104
At least two things emerge from this discussion. First, many
agencies and Executive Branch officials believe that they have the
authority to rule on constitutional issues.105 In some cases, they
rule on issues fundamental to their authority.106 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Thunder Basin lends support to these assertions
of authority,107 but some agency assertions of such power precede
that decision.108 Second, there may be a distinction between declaring a portion of a governing statute unconstitutional (as the Federal
Circuit did in the case In re Tam),109 and declaring a particular application of the law unconstitutional. However, it should be noted
that in Zivotofsky the Executive Branch was not shy about ignoring
a statutory command on constitutional grounds.110 But an administrative judge of the TTAB, a creature of statute who does not di-

unconstitutional. That a denial on such grounds, which are beyond
the power of the Secretary to affect, is nonetheless a decision of the
Secretary for these purposes has been heretofore established.
422 U.S. 749, 764 (1975). The Court also stated: “Plainly these purposes have been
served once the Secretary has satisfied himself that the only issue is the constitutionality
of a statutory requirement, a matter which is beyond his jurisdiction to determine . . . .”
Id. at 765. However, the Court did not cite any authority for the latter proposition. See id.
104
See Bonnichen v. U.S., Dep’t of the Army, 969 F. Supp. 628, 651 (D. Or. 1997)
(stating that agencies may construe statutes to be consistent with the Constitution); see
also Marozan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1492 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting) (“Nothing about the constitutional hierarchy implies that only judges have the
power to place the Constitution above mere law. Every governmental official has the duty
to do this. The power of judicial review comes from the hierarchy of rules, with the
Constitution superior to law; that same hierarchy applies to every other governmental
actor, and each takes an oath of obedience to the Constitution.”).
105
See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2080 (2015); see also Compean, 25 I. &
N. Dec. 1, 3 (A.G. 2009); Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 162–66 (1976);
Raymond J. Lucia Cos., 2015 WL 7785971.
106
See, e.g., Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 3.
107
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994).
108
See, e.g., Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. at 89.
109
In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S.
Ct. 30 (2016).
110
Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2083.
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rectly report to the President, might believe that caution is warranted in the constitutional sphere.
Although as an agency the USPTO is subject to legislative limitations on its authority, there is nothing in the Lanham Act that
precludes the TTAB from deciding constitutional questions.111
That TTAB decisions can be appealed to an Article III court does
not prevent the Board from deciding such questions on its own;
indeed, it suggests that the Board does possess such authority, subject to review by a District Court or the Federal Circuit. The
Board’s statement in Brunetti that the TTAB is not a proper forum
“for re-evaluating the impacts of any evolving First Amendment
jurisprudence within Article III courts” on the interpretation of the
Lanham Act112 ignores its responsibility as a government agency to
account for the possibly variable limitations on its own authority that
result from constitutional decisions. After all, if the Federal Circuit, or another circuit court were to direct the TTAB to conduct a
constitutional review of the application of the Lanham Act in the
registration context, it would seem that the TTAB is bound to
comply.
C. Does Independence Affect Agency Willingness to Hear
Constitutional Claims?
The observation that the TTAB is composed of administrative
judges could help explain the TTAB’s reluctance to address constitutional issues. In the above discussion, the agencies most willing
to address constitutional issues—the FTC, FCC, and SEC—all
use administrative law judges (“ALJs”), not administrative judges
(“AJs”), to conduct their adjudicative hearings.113 AJs are employed and reviewed directly by the agency, whereas ALJs are
111

See generally Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012).
Brunetti, No. 85310960, 2014 WL 3976439 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2014), appeal docketed,
No. 15-1109 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 28, 2014).
113
See Administrative Law Judges, FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/
administrative-law-judges [https://perma.cc/RF9D-PTFN] (last visited Nov. 4, 2016);
Office of Administrative Law Judges, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/aboutftc/bureaus-offices/office-administrative-law-judges [https://perma.cc/86GR-MAXP]
(last visited Nov. 4, 2016); Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/alj [https://perma.cc/H27E-MJL9] (last visited Nov. 4,
2016).
112
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hired through the Office of Personnel Management.114 ALJs are
seen as more independent than AJs, in part because ALJ performance is not subject to direct control by the agency.115 If this perception is accurate, and AJs are less independent than ALJs, then
the relatively less independent AJ may be more reluctant to challenge the constitutionality of the agency’s governing statute.
Similarly, independence could explain the State Department’s
willingness to challenge the constitutionality of Congress’ direction
to issue passports designating Jerusalem, Israel, as a birthplace.116
Presumably, the decision to challenge the law was made at the
highest levels of the State Department, thus insulating the decision
maker from retribution within the agency.117 The MSPB, which
took a middle position, also takes the middle ground regarding
hearing officers.118 In some cases it uses AJs, while at other times it
uses ALJs.119
In sum, there is some evidence that a willingness to address
constitutional arguments is related to the relative independence of
the decision maker. That, of course, should not determine whether
there is authority to consider such arguments. Nevertheless, it suggests that the AJs of the USPTO may seek a cautious approach to
constitutional arguments. The next Part considers how an agency
like the USPTO might cautiously address constitutional issues.

114

Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1647
(2016).
115
Id. at 1654–56.
116
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015).
117
One of the examples of an agency addressing a constitutional issue came from the
staff of the FTC, not a hearing officer. See FTC Staff Comment, supra note 84. But the
FTC is an independent agency, unlike the USPTO, which is part of the Department of
Commerce. TBMP § 102.01 (Jan. 2017). This independence may allow its staff to feel
freer to address the issues.
118
See Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126 (2012).
119
See How to File an Appeal, U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, http://
www.mspb.gov/appeals/appeals.htm [https://perma.cc/WKZ9-ZZ7S] (last visited Nov.
4, 2016) (discussing use of AJs for appeals); Jurisdiction, U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS
PROTECTION BOARD, http://www.mspb.gov/About/jurisdiction.htm [https://perma.cc/
ZD4Z-EVCE] (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) (This page discusses the use of ALJs for certain
original jurisdiction proceedings, stating: “Special Counsel cases and actions against
administrative law judges are heard by the Board Administrative Law Judge, who issues
an initial decision.”).
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III. ADDRESSING CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS AND THE
AVOIDANCE PRINCIPLE
As discussed above, the TTAB’s refusal to address constitutional issues stems from its assertion that, as an administrative
body, it lacks power to declare laws unconstitutional.120 This may
be a logical corollary of the Supreme Court’s statement in Marbury
v. Madison that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”121 However, as the Supreme Court indicated in Thunder Basin, agencies do have the
power to address constitutional issues.122 Even if one concedes a
lack of power to formally declare laws unconstitutional (while noting that this has not prevented other Executive Branch agencies
from considering such questions),123 that does not justify the
Board’s refusal to entertain constitutional issues at all. As was the
case of the Commission in Thunder Basin, the TTAB is well suited
to do so as it is a quasi-judicial body, most of whose members do
not otherwise participate in the USPTO’s regulatory process.124
The Board exercises quasi-judicial power.125 Furthermore, the D.C.
Circuit’s Continental Airlines decision shows that an agency should
be able to at least address an as-applied constitutional challenge (as
opposed to a facial challenge) in the context of an agency proceeding.126 Yet the TTAB refuses even to make the reasonable distinction that would permit it to address constitutional issues.
A. As-Applied vs. Facial Constitutional Challenges
One way that the TTAB could address constitutional issues
would be to distinguish between a facial challenge to the statute
and a challenge that only pertains to its application in a particular
setting. A facial challenge asserts that the law cannot be applied in a
120

See, e.g., Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828, 1832–33 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
122
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 215 (1994).
123
See sources cited supra note 105.
124
See 15 U.S.C. § 1067(b) (2012). The Director of the USPTO, the Deputy Director of
the USPTO, the Commissioner for Patents, and the Commissioner for Trademarks are
members of the Board, although they are greatly outnumbered by appointed trademark
judges. See id.
125
See § 1067(a).
126
Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
121
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constitutional manner as to any situation covered by the statute.127
Such a challenge tests the limits of agency power because it forces
the agency to, in some cases, declare a statute, or a portion of a statute, unenforceable.128 An as-applied challenge only asserts that
enforcement of the statute in this particular context would violate
the Constitution.129 It does not require a declaration that Congress
has exceeded its power in enacting the statute.130 It only requires a
determination that the statute cannot be applied in this particular
situation.131
As federal officers, members of the TTAB are bound to uphold
the Constitution.132 Refusing even to consider whether a particular
action on their part would violate the Constitution seems to be contrary to the oath of office. Moreover, to the extent that Johnson v.
Robison is still seen (after Thunder Basin) as a bar to the authority of
an agency to find its governing statute unconstitutional, using asapplied analyses is perfectly consistent with that principle.133 The
agency is not called upon to challenge the legitimacy of its governing statute, which remains in force for all constitutionally legitimate
purposes.134
The discussion in Section II.B demonstrates that, the great majority of the time, those issues involve as-applied challenges rather
than challenges to the legitimacy of the governing statute.135 Thus,
the FTC’s discussions of constitutional principles involved particular applications of the FTC’s authority to advertising and the
127

This was the conclusion of the Federal Circuit regarding the disparagement
provision of the Lanham Act. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
128
See, e.g., Stefanie A. Lundquist & Pamela C. Corley, The Multiple-Stage Process of
Judicial Review: Facial and As-Applied Constitutional Challenges, 40 J. LEG. STUD. 467, 475
(2011) (noting that an as-applied challenge is less of an institutional challenge to the
legislature).
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
See Marozan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1492 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting).
133
415 U.S. 361, 370 n.12 (1974).
134
Id at 383.
135
See generally Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 657 (2010).
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consequent interaction with First Amendment principles.136 They
did not implicate the FTC’s authority to regulate advertising in
general.137 Similarly, the FCC’s discussions of First Amendment
limits on its authority were in the context of particular cases; the
FCC did not purport to challenge the constitutionality of the governing statute.138 Indeed, its statement that its authority should be
read with the First Amendment in mind139 is exactly the sort of
principle that should guide the TTAB.
By contrast, in Harjo the Board dismissed the distinction between an as-applied challenge and a facial challenge to the statutory
ban on registration of disparaging or scandalous marks.140 The
Board stated that it was “a distinction without a difference.”141
However, the Board’s focus continued to be on its perceived lack
of authority to declare laws unconstitutional.142 It did not explain
why it believed that declaring a failure to register a particular mark
on the grounds of disparagement and/or scandalousness amounts
to a declaration that a portion of the Lanham Act was unconstitutional.143
B. The Avoidance Principle
If the TTAB will not address constitutional issues directly, is
there a way to allow it to address the Constitution in a manner that
avoids the issue of agency power to declare laws or agency actions
unconstitutional? The answer lies in the principle that courts (and,
presumably, agencies) should seek to interpret statutes in ways that
avoid constitutional decisions unless absolutely necessary.
The idea of avoiding constitutional decisions dates back to the
nineteenth century,144 but it is most commonly associated with Jus136

Id.; see also Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 162–66 (1976).
See Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. at 162–66; see also FTC Staff Comment, supra note 81.
138
See 21st Century Fax(es) Ltd., 17 FCC Rcd. 1384, 1388 (2002).
139
Id.
140
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1710 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d, 284 F.
Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003).
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
See, e.g., Liverpool & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39
(1885).
137
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tice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority.145 Justice Brandeis set out seven (sometimes overlapping) principles, the last of which is particularly relevant here:
When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn
in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this
Court will first ascertain whether the construction
of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided.146
As many scholars have chronicled, the Ashwander avoidance
principles have been widely cited by courts.147 However, the avoidance principle is not a panacea, either for courts or agencies. Scholars have identified flaws in the doctrine. As noted constitutional
scholar Frederick Schauer has pointed out, there are costs associated with avoiding constitutional decisions.148 Courts may make
strained interpretations of statutes that stray from the drafters’ intent in order to avoid constitutional issues, for example.149 It may
not accurately reflect the will of Congress to assume that even a
tortured interpretation of a statute is preferable to ruling it unconstitutional.150 Avoidance also evades political accountability for odd
interpretations of statutes, since Congress may not have the same
incentive to amend a statute after a flawed construction that it has
when a statute is struck down.151 Avoidance is also somewhat of a
misnomer, in that it does not truly avoid a constitutional decision;
it simply changes the parameters of the analysis.152 Thus, avoidance does not necessarily avoid constitutional discussions, because
one must identify and discuss a serious constitutional issue as part

145

297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 348 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
147
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 73 (1995).
148
Id. at 74.
149
Id. at 74, 81–82.
150
See generally Caleb Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional Questions Versus Avoiding
Unconstitutionality, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 331 (2015).
151
See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709
(1998).
152
Id. at 1766.
146
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of the process of avoiding it.153 Nevertheless, the avoidance principle is quite firmly embedded in the constitutional landscape.
Several cases have indicated that agencies do have the authority
to interpret their governing statutes to avoid constitutional problems. For example, in Bonnichsen v. U.S., Department of the Army,
the court raised the question of whether the Army Corps of Engineers could evaluate equal protection claims brought by the plaintiffs.154 Citing Thunder Basin, the court indicated that the agency
could actually adjudicate the claims on the merits, but further
stated: “Even if the agency cannot directly declare a statute unconstitutional, there is authority that an agency may consider constitutional issues in construing and applying a statute or regulation.”155 In support of this principle, the district court cited the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton
Christian Schools, Inc.156 There, in an opinion ordering a district
court to abstain in favor of a state agency determination of a sex
discrimination complaint, the Court responded to an argument that
the state agency could not hear the (religious school) employer’s
First Amendment defenses:
[E]ven if Ohio law is such that the [Ohio Civil
Rights] Commission may not consider the constitutionality of the statute under which it operates, it
would seem an unusual doctrine, and one not supported by the cited case, to say that the Commission
could not construe its own statutory mandate in the
light of federal constitutional principles.157
Although the case involved a state agency, not a federal one,
there is no reason to believe that the principle is not equally applicable to a federal agency.158
153

Id. at 1789–90.
969 F. Supp. 628, 649–650 (D. Or. 1997).
155
Id. at 651.
156
477 U.S. 619 (1986).
157
Id. at 629; see also Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 747 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Ohio
Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 629) (The court found that the Michigan agency could
hear constitutional claims or, if not, could “narrowly construe” the statute to avoid the
issue.).
158
For additional discussion of the legitimacy of the use of avoidance by agencies, see
Metzger, supra note 39, at 1916–20.
154
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One example of the Supreme Court’s use of the avoidance
principle involved both avoidance and an agency willing to address
constitutional principles. In National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago (which was cited in Dayton Christian Schools),
the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) asserted jurisdiction over Catholic schools in the context of attempts to unionize
the lay faculty and ordered the school to bargain collectively.159
The Board rejected claims by the schools that asserting such jurisdiction would violate the Establishment and/or Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment.160 After the Seventh Circuit reversed, the NLRB appealed to the Supreme Court.161 The Court
conceded that there were constitutional claims involved, but was
reluctant to address them:
Although the respondents press their claims under
the Religion Clauses, the question we consider first
is whether Congress intended the Board to have jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools.
In a number of cases the Court has heeded the essence of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition in
Murray v. Charming Betsy, by holding that an Act of
Congress ought not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible construction remains
available. Moreover, the Court has followed this
policy in the interpretation of the Act now before us
and related statutes.162
The Court proceeded to interpret the relevant statute to preclude jurisdiction by the NLRB, thus avoiding the constitutional issue.163

159

440 U.S. 490 (1979).
See id. at 493–95. The NLRB uses ALJs as its hearing officers, making its willingness
to consider constitutional arguments consistent with the discussion of independence
above.
161
See id. at 490.
162
Id. at 500 (citation omitted).
163
See id. at 504–07. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan did not deny the existence
of the avoidance principle. Id. at 508–09 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The general principle
of construing statutes to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions is a well-settled and
salutary one.”). Instead, he challenged the majority’s construction of the statute. Id.
160
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C. The Avoidance Principle and the TTAB
For the moment, put aside the costs and focus on some benefits
of avoidance in the context of TTAB decision-making. If the
TTAB is wary of declaring its own agency’s actions—or its governing statute—unconstitutional, the avoidance principle may provide
a way to address constitutional issues without actually making such
a declaration. Although the purpose of that mechanism is to avoid a
constitutional decision, it almost invariably requires a court to address the constitutional issues in order to determine whether a serious constitutional question exists.164 Unlike an as-applied constitutional analysis, this canon of construction provides a means for
the TTAB to address constitutional issues without having to declare laws—or even particular agency actions—unconstitutional.165
It can seek a construction of the Lanham Act that avoids what
would otherwise be serious constitutional problems with the
USPTO’s actions. Thus, for example, in recent cases such as ProFootball, Inc. v. Blackhorse and In re Tam, which raised free speech
questions about the application of section 2(a) of the Lanham Act
(barring the registration of disparaging marks), the Board could
have determined whether cancelling one registration (Washington
Redskins) or denying another (Slants, by an Asian-American band)
would raise serious free speech problems based on precedents from
the Supreme Court and lower courts.166 If the Board felt that granting relief or denying registration would create constitutional problems, it could seek an interpretation of “disparaging” that would
obviate the problem.
The avoidance principle, with all of its faults, can be applied in
a somewhat straightforward manner by a court. But the TTAB is
not a court—it is a quasi-judicial arm of an administrative agency.
Scholars have pondered issues relating to the application of constitutional avoidance in the agency context, although normally with164

See, e.g., Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme
Court’s Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 16–
17 (1996).
165
Id. at 11.
166
In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 571 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137
S. Ct. 30 (2016); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 477 (E.D. Va.
2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015).
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out directly addressing how an agency might apply the doctrine.
Some of that scholarship discusses the interaction between the
avoidance principle and the doctrine established in Chevron USA,
Inc. v. National Resource Defense Council, which mandates deference
to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute
(or a statute that delegates interpretation to an agency).167 Courts
and commentators have debated whether avoidance mandates that
a court override the agency’s interpretation when it raises a constitutional question (i.e., even if the agency’s statutory interpretation
is not definitively unconstitutional; the fact that it raises a serious
constitutional question may trigger avoidance).168 Some have argued that Chevron deference should prevail over avoidance, subject
to a definitive constitutional ruling on the agency’s action.169
But those arguments do not capture the context of a TTAB
proceeding. The TTAB is not operating as a rule maker in the
usual administrative manner. The Board does not engage in noteand-comment rulemaking, which includes the possible influence of
the political process on the decision.170 Rather, it adjudicates individual cases mostly using the same rules of procedure and evidence
that would be used in a court. The “rules” that the Board creates
are its precedential opinions, setting forth its interpretations of applicable law in the registration context.171 There is little direct accountability in the political sense; as noted earlier, most of the
members of the TTAB are appointed as trademark judges, not general policy makers.172 Although TTAB decisions are afforded a cer167

467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
See generally Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons in the Review of
Administrative Interpretations of Law: A Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, 64
ADMIN. L. REV. 139 (2012).
169
Id.
170
Such political influence may seem positive to those who view Chevron as reinforcing
political accountability. See id. at 149–50 (discussing accountability and Chevron); see also
id. at 177–79 (discussing separation of powers issues and Chevron).
171
See TBMP § 101.03 (Jan. 2017); id. § 1203.02(f).The TTAB issues both precedential
and non-precedential decisions. Precedential decisions are viewed as binding; nonprecedential decisions, while citable, are not binding on the Board. § 101.03
172
See 15 U.S.C. § 1067 (2012). The TTAB includes political policy makers such as the
Director and Deputy Director of the USPTO, the Commissioner for Patents, and the
Commissioner for Trademarks. Of course, as employees of the USPTO (and the
Commerce Department), trademark judges may feel some obligation to adhere to the
custom of the TTAB and the USPTO in refusing to address constitutional issues (and in
168
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tain amount of factual deference if they are appealed to the Federal
Circuit,173 aggrieved parties are entitled to a de novo review in a
district court if they so choose.174
Moreover, the availability of de novo review may suggest caution in applying Chevron deference to the TTAB, especially if it
uses the avoidance principle to interpret the statute.175 The fact
that the Lanham Act emerged out of the common law of trademarks, and that it clearly contemplates courts as the primary enforcers (and, probably, interpreters) of the statute, similarly—or
perhaps more strongly—counsels caution in making the TTAB the
last word in the interpretation of a statute.176
D. The TTAB’s Constitutional Choices
1. Boldly Going Where the TTAB Has Not Gone Before:
Making a Constitutional Decision
The Thunder Basin opinion shows that the TTAB does possess
the authority to address constitutional issues.177 Thus, its refusal to
address those issues represents more of a policy choice than a matter of authority.178 As a policy matter, the TTAB’s choice is a questionable one. The members of the Board do not lack the expertise
other decisions as well). It would be naïve to assume that non-trademark judges exert no
influence over policy. Moreover, when the TTAB issues a precedential decision, it is
engaged in a form of statutory interpretation that may be entitled to deference. See, e.g.,
Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 634–39 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Chevron to TTAB
proceedings).
173
The Federal Circuit applies a “substantial evidence” review of TTAB factual
decisions. See, e.g., In re Inca Textiles, LLC, 344 F. App’x 603 (Fed Cir. 2009); On-Line
Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Under this
standard, the TTAB’s decision is upheld if “a reasonable person might find that the
evidentiary record supports the agency’s conclusion.” Id.
174
See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1) (2012); CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660,
674–75 (7th Cir. 2001).
175
CAE, Inc., 267 F.3d at 674–75.
176
Where the statutory provisions uniquely deal with the technicalities of registration
such caution would be less justified. Cf. Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Deference and
Patent Exceptionalism, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 149 (2016) (arguing that the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board, or PTAB, should be given deference as to interpretations of patent law).
177
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 215 (1994); see also supra notes 50–
55 and accompanying text.
178
Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 215; see also supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
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to address these issues.179 They are lawyers, experts in trademark
law, and presumably familiar with the constitutional issues that
frequently arise in the trademark arena.180 Although the TTAB’s
jurisdiction is limited to trademark registrations, the Supreme
Court clearly views the Board as possessing authority somewhat
like a federal court,181 even when its decisions are not reviewed by
an Article III court.182 Given the Board’s authority and expertise in
trademark matters, there are several good reasons for why it should
decide relevant constitutional issues.183 First, it may streamline liti179

Hope Hamilton, Note, Parsing the Standard of Review Puzzle: How Much Deference
Should Federal District Courts Afford Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Decisions?, 12 FED.
CIR. B.J. 489, 514 (2003).
180
TBMP § 102.03 (Jan. 2017); John L. Welch, Current Roster of TTAB Administrative
Trademark Judges, TTABLOG (Oct. 14, 2015), http://thettablog.blogspot.com/2015/10/
current-roster-of-ttab-administrative.html [https://perma.cc/9Y6M-GDPZ].
181
B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Ind., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1300 (2015) (“Opposition
proceedings before the TTAB are in many ways ‘similar to a civil action in a federal
district court.’” (quoting TBMP § 102.03)).
182
Id. at 1305 (noting that a failure to appeal TTAB decisions does not deprive them of
preclusive effect).
183
Technically, the analysis set forth here could apply to trademark examiners as well as
trademark judges. Examiners are government officials, charged with making decisions
about registrations. However, requiring examiners to consider constitutional arguments
(unless directed to do so by the courts) presents problems. Examiners need to act with
reasonable speed and there are hundreds of thousands of trademark applications each
year. See Data Visualization Center, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/trademarks/main.dashxml [https://perma.cc/8998UJRM] (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) (showing over 500,000 filed in fiscal year 2015).
Applications made pursuant to the Madrid Protocol must obtain a USPTO ruling within
eighteen months of the time that the applicant requests registration (technically an
“extension of protection”), or else the request will be automatically granted. See 15
U.S.C. § 1141h (2012) (stating that the USPTO Director must notify the International
Bureau within eighteen months of refusal, filing of opposition, or possibility of filing
opposition); id. § 1141i (stating that extension of protection must be issued unless refusal
is made pursuant to section 1141h). Thus, a prompt review of applications is very
important. Forcing examiners to respond to constitutional arguments could encourage
many constitutional claims, slowing the examination process. Given the number of
applicants and the number of examiners, this also could lead to uneven application of the
law. It makes more sense to consolidate authority to hear constitutional claims in the
TTAB, where there is a greater likelihood of consistency (and the TTAB uses panels of at
least three judges). Given the Supreme Court’s implication that agencies have a certain
amount of discretion about addressing constitutional arguments, limiting an applicant’s
ability to raise constitutional concerns to the TTAB level should not violate due process.
The government’s interest in effective management of trademark applications, combined
with the applicant’s ability to raise the issue within the agency process before the Board,
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gation.184 In a case like In re Tam, if the TTAB had allowed registration (or, more precisely, publication for opposition) the burden
would be on someone else to come forward, claim harm, file an opposition, and be willing to take the case to the next level, if necessary.185 If no opposition was filed, the case would end there.186 Even
if an opposition had been filed, the opposition proceeding would
give the TTAB the opportunity to revisit its ruling based on a more
complete record.187
This latter observation leads to a second policy favoring TTAB
decision-making: creating a proper record.188 The Supreme Court
has noted (albeit outside of the trademark field) the potential importance of a factual record in a lower court in deciding constitutional issues.189 Having the TTAB decide constitutional questions
in the first instance permits parties to make a complete factual
record before they have to make a decision to appeal.190 Moreover,
in the absence of TTAB decision-making, where a factual record is
important to resolving the constitutional issue,191 it virtually forces
a party into a de novo appeal to a district court, where additional
evidence can be presented, rather than to the Federal Circuit,
which decides on the record before the TTAB.192 In an ex parte
proceeding such as those in the Tam or Brunetti cases, an appellant
should outweigh the applicant’s interest in having examiners weigh the issue. This does
not mean that examiners should not be sensitive to constitutional issues in the registration
process, but they need not formally incorporate it into the examination process. The
USPTO would seem to have ample authority to issue rules governing such matters.
184
See generally In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016); see also Note, supra note 39, at 1687.
185
See 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (2012).
186
Id.
187
In the examination process, only the applicant would introduce evidence. In an
opposition proceeding, the opposing party may also introduce evidence. See TBMP
§ 102.03 (Jan. 2017) (describing the different proceedings held before the TTAB); id.
§ 1208 (discussing treatment of evidence in ex parte appeals to the TTAB).
188
See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016).
189
Id.
190
See Bonnichsen v. U.S., Dep’t of Army, 969 F. Supp. 628, 651 (D. Or. 1997) (The
court directed the plaintiffs on remand to agency to “make any record below that is
needed to support [the constitutional claims],” stating that “this procedure will help to
simplify this case . . . by creating a single record for review instead of making a second
record in this court.”).
191
See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310.
192
Hamilton, supra note 179, at 492–98.
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faces a significant penalty for choosing a de novo review, even if he
or she wins.193 This may chill the pursuit of constitutional issues by
some litigants who need to make a factual record.194
In the Brunetti case, which dealt with the bar to registering
scandalous and immoral marks, the Board offered another rationale
for refusing to hear constitutional issues: the need to “[reevaluate]
the impacts of any evolving First Amendment jurisprudence within
Article III courts upon determinations under section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act.”195 This reason does not stand up to scrutiny. The
Lanham Act has many provisions directly relating to registration—
i.e., provisions that the TTAB must interpret and apply—that are
subject to continuing interpretation by Article III courts.196 For example, the line between “descriptive” marks and inherently distinctive marks is surely one that courts could reevaluate if they so
choose. The Federal Circuit has already reevaluated the line between “primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive” and
primarily geographically misdescriptive.197 The Federal Circuit has
overturned TTAB precedent on the issue of what constitutes fraud
on the USPTO (which cancels registrations ab initio—that is, from
their inception).198 The doctrine of functionality, which bars the
registration of certain marks, has undergone significant doctrinal
reevaluation, forcing the TTAB to accommodate a new and uncertain legal terrain.199 Adapting to doctrinal changes in constitutional
interpretation should pose no special difficulty for the Board.

193

See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3) (2012) (stating that de novo appellant in a non-opposition
proceeding must pay the costs and attorney’s fees of the USPTO, even if the appeal is
successful); Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219, 221 (4th Cir. 2015) (affirming decision
of court below to impose all expenses on plaintiff in ex parte proceeding regardless of
whether plaintiff won or lost), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016).
194
See generally Shammas, 784 F.3d at 221.
195
Brunetti, No. 85310960, 2014 WL 3976439, at *5 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2014), appeal
docketed, No. 15-1109 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 28, 2014).
196
See generally Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141(n) (2012).
197
In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
198
In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 1244–46 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
199
See, e.g., In re Becton, Dickinson & Co., 675 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing
the effect of more recent Supreme Court cases on the doctrine).
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The TTAB’s decision to address constitutional issues need not
put the Board on a collision course with Congress.200 As discussed
earlier, agencies occasionally have decided issues fundamental to
their governing structure, but more often their constitutional discussions occur in a specific factual context.201 Although the TTAB
has previously rejected a distinction between facial and as-applied
challenges,202 such a distinction makes sense from the perspective
of agency authority. A full record—which may be more pertinent
to as-applied challenges—would enhance and streamline constitutional decision-making, both at the TTAB and appellate levels. An
as-applied challenge leaves open the issue of the general unconstitutionality of the statute.203
If the TTAB makes a distinction between those cases requiring
a declaration that the law is unconstitutional generally, and those
only requiring a finding that the law as applied in a particular case
would be unconstitutional, the Board could address the constitutional issues in the latter directly. In such cases (which would include Tam and Blackhorse), the TTAB need not be concerned with
whether a provision of the Lanham Act is constitutional on its face.
In the case of section 2(a), all that would be required is a recognition that some disparaging marks are protected by free speech principles, while others are not.204
200

Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 75,837, Investment Advisors
Release No. 4,190, Investment Company Release No. 31,806, 112 SEC Docket 6 (Sept. 3,
2015), petition denied, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), reh’g granted, vacated, 2017 WL
631744 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017).
201
Id.
202
See Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1710 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d,
284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003).
203
It is, of course, possible that an appellate court would choose to make a facial ruling,
as done in Tam. But the appellate court still could benefit from a full record.
204
See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). After the Federal Circuit’s decision declaring section 2(a)
unconstitutional on its face with regard to disparaging marks, the more salient issue may
be scandalousness, as discussed in a hypothetical below. But see Letter Brief, supra note
14, at 1 (asserting that Tam’s reasoning applies equally to scandalous and immoral marks).
Still, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Tam will not be the final word on the matter,
considering the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in the case. Blackhorse will be
reviewed by the Fourth Circuit, not the Federal Circuit. See Pro-Football, Inc. v.
Blackhorse, No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015). The Supreme Court denied ProFootball’s request for certiorari before the Fourth Circuit could hear its appeal. Pro-
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As-applied challenges are not, unfortunately, a panacea. One
problem with this approach is that it forces the TTAB to distinguish between those disparaging or scandalous marks that are freespeech-worthy from those that are not. Because this may depend
on the context of the actual use of the mark, the TTAB may not be
in a good position to evaluate the issue as it is often adjudicated
prior to actual use (and it must assume that all possible uses within
the parameters of the application for registration are relevant). Unless the Federal Circuit gives good guidance to the TTAB, this may
prove to be a difficult task.
The Federal Circuit might even force the issue upon the
TTAB. The Board feels bound “to a large extent” by decisions of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.205 But suppose the
Federal Circuit—say, in deciding In re Tam (the attempt to register
Slants)—had decided that, although an application that is the subject of the TTAB’s refusal is arguably within the realm of disparagement under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, if applied in this
context refusal to register would be unconstitutional. This mandates that the USPTO allow registration. That direction, presumably, binds the TTAB.206 However, how does the TTAB decide the
next case? Does the TTAB ignore the constitutional issues again
and force an appeal to the Federal Circuit? That seems wasteful.
And rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure admonishes
courts “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.”207 Granted, the TTAB could take
the position that administrative necessity commands it to ignore
rule 1. But that hardly seems a sensible course of action. It would
have a chilling effect on any potential registrant who lacks the resources to litigate the case vigorously through both an opposition
proceeding (or an appeal to the TTAB from an examiner’s denial)

Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 137 S. Ct. 44 (2016) (mem.). One might also distinguish Tam
from Blackhorse on the ground that the proposed use in Tam more directly implicates
advocacy of a free speech principle—the band is trying to delegitimize Slant as a
disparaging term for people of Asian descent.
205
TBMP § 101.03 (Jan. 2017).
206
Technically, it is only formally binding in that case. However, as precedent, the
principle of the case would be binding in future cases. See id.
207
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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and an appeal to the Federal Circuit.208 But then, suppose that the
Federal Circuit directs the TTAB to consider the constitutional issues in individual registration cases. Would the TTAB simply
refuse to accede to that direction? Does the Lanham Act delegate
authority to the Board or the USPTO Director to decide to ignore
such direction by the Federal Circuit? And, if so, does Chevron deference apply to such decisions?209 These are not all easy questions.
But at least they reach the heart of the issue—that the matter of
constitutionality is not one of authority, but of policy. If the
USPTO is going to avoid such issues on policy grounds, it would be
best advised to articulate those grounds and issue proper guidance
to the TTAB.
2. The Softer Approach: Avoidance and the TTAB
Assuming that the TTAB agrees to decide constitutional issues, but the Board is concerned about its authority to declare laws
unconstitutional, or is concerned about its ability to make the necessary constitutional distinctions, how should the Board proceed?210

208

A trial de novo in the district court may appear even more daunting in light of the
USPTO’s apparent determination to force ex parte litigants who choose that option to
pay the USPTO’s expenses, including attorney’s fees. These expenses would be imposed
if an applicant chooses a de novo appeal from a denial of registration not resulting from an
opposition—i.e., the TTAB upholds the examiner’s denial—which was the situation in
Tam, and the fees and expenses are not waived even if the private litigant wins. See 15
U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3) (2012); see also Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2015)
(upholding the requirement that even a successful applicant must pay the USPTO’s
expenses), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016). The requirement to pay expenses only
applies to appeals de novo to a district court, not direct appeals to the Federal Circuit.
209
As to this, presumably not. The Federal Circuit would probably take the position
that such an interpretation of the Board’s authority was unreasonable, making Chevron
deference unnecessary. On the other hand, following the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Tam, the USPTO issued an examination guide, suspending applications that would be
refused on the grounds that the mark is disparaging, immoral, or scandalous. (The
suspension will be lifted once the Supreme Court decides the case.) U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., EXAMINATION GUIDE 01-16 (Mar. 2016) (on file with the Fordham
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal). Moreover, the availability of
de novo review may countenance caution about applying Chevron deference to the TTAB,
especially if it uses the avoidance.
210
Note that it may be preferable to have the Board decide all issues, at least
preliminarily, even if it lacks authority to declare laws unconstitutional.
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One approach is for the TTAB to use a variant of the avoidance
principle. As an arm of an agency, the TTAB theoretically is not
subject to some of the counter-majoritarian restraints that have
been used to support the avoidance principle.211 On the other hand,
as a quasi-judicial body, the Board does not necessarily reflect the
political agenda of the incumbent administration.212 Thus, the restraints of avoidance may be appropriate. Indeed, even if one believes that the avoidance principle should not be followed by
courts, one might endorse a form of it at the TTAB. If an agency
tribunal is without power to declare a law unconstitutional, then it
cannot always decide the constitutional question. However, as a
governmental body, it is bound by the Constitution. The avoidance
principle allows it to address the issue without technically resolving
it.
The application of avoidance in the TTAB can operate as a rule
of doubt or presumption of registrability. When a refusal to register
would raise a serious constitutional question, the Board should only
reject the application (at least on the grounds that raise the question) if it is very certain that the refusal is constitutional.
In the context of ex parte appeals, that approach would reduce
the need for appeals to the Federal Circuit by allowing the registration to issue. This would not preclude the courts from hearing the
issue. Anyone who may be harmed by the registration can bring a
cancellation proceeding.213 As the Blackhorse case illustrates, apart
from laches considerations, there is no time limit for cancellation
under section 2(a).214 Alternatively, an aggrieved person may bring
an opposition prior to registration.215 Although the TTAB is unlikely to alter its view of the case in the second proceeding, it is possi211

See Schauer, supra note 147, at 91–92.
Eleven of the current trademark judges were appointed before President Obama took
office in January 2009. Three of those judges were appointed before 2000. John L. Welch,
Current Roster of TTAB Judges, TTABLOG (Oct. 3, 2016), http://thettablog.blogspot.com
/2016/10/current-roster-of-ttab-judges.html [https://perma.cc/ZM4B-HCDV]. As
noted earlier, the TTAB also includes the Director and the Deputy Director of the
USPTO, as well as the Commissioner of Patents and the Commissioner of Trademarks.
See supra note 124.
213
15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012).
214
§ 1064(3). For some grounds, there is a statutory five-year time limit. Id.
215
Id. § 1063(a).
212
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ble to appeal that decision to an Article III court, which can definitively resolve any constitutional questions.
The Catholic Bishop case, discussed above, provides an example
of how an agency could avoid a constitutional declaration. In
Catholic Bishop, the NLRB could have chosen an interpretation of
its statutory authority that precluded jurisdiction, in light of the
constitutional issues that asserting jurisdiction would raise.216 It
would then be left to a reviewing Article III court to determine the
correctness of the NLRB’s interpretation and, if necessary, resolve
the constitutional issues raised by a contrary interpretation of the
NLRB’s jurisdiction.217
Consider how the TTAB might apply this technique in the future. One likely area of use is the application of section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act to “scandalous” marks.218 The Federal Circuit in the
Tam case held that section 2(a) was unconstitutional on its face with
respect to disparaging marks—that is, section 2(a) could not constitutionally bar the registration of any mark deemed disparaging. 219
The Federal Circuit will not have the last word on this issue,220 but
the TTAB has said that it looks to the Federal Circuit for its guiding precedent (at least in the absence of Supreme Court
precedent).221 But In re Tam specifically limited its holding to disparaging marks and did not address the scandalousness bar.222 For
the sake of argument, assume that the scandalousness bar could be
216

See generally NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
This, of course, assumes that the constitutional issue would supersede any Chevron
deference to which the NLRB’s interpretation of its jurisdiction would be entitled. See
Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 712–13
(2007). A detailed examination of the intersection of Chevron and avoidance is beyond the
scope of this Article.
218
Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
219
In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). Although the Federal Circuit did not use the words “on its
face,” its opinion made clear that it intended to strike down section 2(a) completely, not
just as it applied to the case at bar. See id.
220
Obviously, the grant of certiorari gives the Supreme Court the last word; whether
the Fourth Circuit will address the issue in the appeal of Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse
prior to the Supreme Court is uncertain.
221
See generally Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F.Supp.2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003).
222
In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1358.
217
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applied in some cases.223 The most notable cases would involve
marks that are legally obscene.224 Obscenity does not merit First
Amendment protection.225 However, marks that are merely offensive or indecent merit some First Amendment protection. On the
other hand, even offensive marks are subject to some regulation, as
is evident from broadcasting jurisprudence.226 A challenge to a refusal to register a scandalous mark presents the TTAB with several
choices. The boldest position would be to declare the scandalous
bar unconstitutionally vague.227 However, this possibility, discussed above, is an unlikely choice for the TTAB. Although other
agencies have taken equally bold steps, it does not appear that they
are required to do so. The TTAB is likely to seek a solution that
requires the least possible constitutional intervention, and this
represents the greatest degree of intervention. Even after In re Tam,
one could imagine that the TTAB could reiterate its position so
that it would not address constitutional issues at all.228 However, In
223

The USPTO has effectively conceded that it cannot be applied constitutionally in
light of Tam, having stated in a letter brief that the reasoning of In re Tam applies equally
to scandalous marks as to disparaging marks. Letter Brief, supra note 14, at 2–4.
224
Marks to be used on illegal goods or services would be refused registration by the
USPTO on the ground that they are not in lawful use in commerce. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.69
(2016); TMEP § 907 (Jan. 2017). It also appears that the USPTO would refuse to register
marks that independently violate federal law, apart from any section 2(a) issues. See
TMEP § 907. That could be the case with legally obscene marks as well.
225
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21 (1973). One could argue that the government
has no legitimate interest in barring trademark registration even of obscene marks, given
that obscene works are eligible for copyright protection. But it is not necessary to address
that argument now.
226
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747–51 (1978) (finding indecent, but not
obscene, monologue could be barred from broadcast under the circumstances of the
case); cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012) (The Court
concluded that the FCC violated due process rights of broadcaster by not giving fair
notice that “fleeting expletives” could be deemed indecent, but the Court did not rule on
the constitutionality of such a bar.).
227
Unlike disparaging marks, which target a specific person or group, and are thus
susceptible to viewpoint discrimination, scandalous marks may offend a large, but
nonspecific, group of the population. See Emily S. Kustina, Comment, Discriminatory
Discretion: USPTO Procedures and Viewpoint Discrimination Under Section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 547–49 (2016).
228
Cf. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Pitts, 115 U.S.P.Q.2d 1099 (T.T.A.B. 2015)
(refusing to vacate opinion when parties stipulated to vacate as part of settlement), rev’d
sub nom. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Houndstooth Mafia Enters., 163 F. Supp. 3d
1150 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 2016) (ordering TTAB to vacate prior decision in order to
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re Tam makes that position improvident. It is clear that the TTAB
cannot—consistent with In re Tam—maintain that the First
Amendment does not apply to trademark registrations. Ignoring
the constitutional issue altogether virtually mandates an appeal in
any case where the Board upholds a refusal to register a scandalous
mark (including any case where registration of a scandalous mark is
opposed and the opposition is sustained). That is wasteful. Thus, it
makes sense to find a way to deal with the issue at the Board level
to avoid the unnecessarily imposition on the Federal Circuit’s
docket. A reasonable approach would be to recognize a distinction
between as-applied and facial constitutional challenges, addressing
the former but not the latter.229 In that situation, the Board would
address the constitutional challenge directly. There is no apparent
impediment to the TTAB adopting this approach. It is straightforward and it has the advantage of clearly presenting the legal issues
in the event of an appeal. If the TTAB has used an erroneous legal
standard, the Federal Circuit (or another reviewing court, if a party
elects to appeal to a district court) can clarify the standard, making
it less likely that future appeals will be necessary. Once one accepts
that First Amendment challenges (or challenges under other constitutional provisions, such as the Commerce Clause) are appropriate in trademark registration proceedings, this is the most logical
approach. Thus, even after In re Tam, the scandalous mark provision may be susceptible to an as-applied challenge, which takes into
account the context of the use.
However, as discussed above, the TTAB may be more averse
to making constitutional decisions than agencies that use ALJs as
adjudicators. If so, the Board could review rulings on scandalous
marks with an eye toward avoiding a constitutional decision.230
complete the settlement agreed to by the parties). The TTAB subsequently acceded to
the court’s order, but specifically reserved the right to appeal. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Pitts, Opp. No. 91187103 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2016) (not precedential).
229
As discussed earlier, the TTAB so far has refused to recognize this distinction. See
supra Section III.A.
230
In the wake of In re Tam, the USPTO issued a new examination guide that suspends
all trademark applications where the examiner finds the mark to be disparaging,
scandalous, or immoral until such time as the Federal Circuit issues its decision in
Brunetti (this applies to scandalous or immoral refusals), or the decision in Tam becomes
final and non-appealable, either by passage of time or by Supreme Court decision in the
case. See EXAMINATION GUIDE 01-16, supra note 209. Thus, the USPTO is effectively
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That review could come in different forms. The most drastic would
be to interpret “scandalous” as applying only to those marks clearly outside of First Amendment protection, which might not be acceptable to the Federal Circuit as the proper legal standard.231 A
less drastic approach would ask whether the refusal to register the
mark in question would raise serious constitutional questions (especially in light of In re Tam). If it does, then the TTAB should allow the mark to be registered. An interesting example of how this
might work is the Board’s decision in the case In re Luxuria, where
the applicant sought to register a bottle shaped like a raised middle
finger as a trademark.232 This application involved more than a
simple word trademark; it was about a product configuration as a
mark. Thus, the decision implicated the product as well as the
mark. The product clearly had communicative value. It is reasonable to assume that the mark was denied registration because of its
message. That arguably raises a serious constitutional question under In re Tam over whether the USPTO was engaging in viewpoint
discrimination. Absent a compelling governmental interest, which
would be very difficult to show, such an action would be unconstitutional. Under that analysis, the Board’s decision should have
gone the other way, and a registration should have been allowed in
order to avoid a constitutional question about the scope of the
scandalousness bar.

removing itself from making any decisions regarding the constitutionality of applications
under the scandalous, immoral, or disparaging provisions of section 2(a).
231
As discussed above, one might argue that the Chevron doctrine would require
deference to the TTAB’s interpretation. See, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632,
634–36 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Chevron to TTAB proceedings). The term scandalous is
arguably ambiguous, which would satisfy the first part of the test. But the Federal Circuit
could find the limited interpretation to be unreasonable, especially in view of the many
TTAB opinions taking a more expansive view of the term. See, e.g., In re Bose, 580 F.3d
1240, 1243–45 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (reviewing the TTAB’s legal standard de novo and
deciding that the TTAB applied an incorrect standard as to fraud on the USPTO); see also
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 577 (1988) (concluding that Chevron deference is not applicable where agency’s
construction raises serious constitutional questions and other interpretations not raising
those questions are available); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, No. 99–1385 (CKK), 2000 WL
1923326, at *1, *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2000) (specifically applying de novo standard instead
of Chevron deference).
232
Luxuria, s.r.o., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1146 (T.T.A.B. 2011).
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CONCLUSION
The TTAB’s history of refusing to entertain constitutional arguments is premised on a flawed assumption of lack of authority.
Not only do other agencies and executive departments address
constitutional arguments, the Supreme Court, in the Thunder Basin
decision,233 has undercut the authority rationale for the TTAB’s
inaction. At most, the Board’s refusal to address those issues
should be seen as a policy decision. But this policy is unwise. First,
if In re Tam is upheld,234 it will be difficult to argue that trademark
registration decisions are immune from constitutional attack. Thus,
a continued failure to address the issues forces applicants (and registrants in cancellation proceedings) to appeal to courts to raise
their constitutional issues. This is a poor way to funnel the issues.
Although Tam struck down the disparagement bar to registration
on its face,235 future cases may recognize as-applied challenges to
registration. Such issues—as well as many facial challenges—are
best addressed with a proper factual record. Because the Federal
Circuit decides appeals on the basis of the TTAB record, litigants
will be forced to appeal to a district court to make a record, which,
in some cases, will force them to pay the USPTO’s expenses.
Putting a penalty on constitutional decision-making is not only unwise; it may be a denial of due process. Although the Board may be
wary of wading into the vagaries of constitutional law, trademark
law is replete with changing doctrine and the Board should not let
that be a roadblock to effective decision-making. To the extent that
the TTAB wishes to avoid constitutional issues even in the face of
these reasons, it should at least use the avoidance principle to determine whether an applicant or registrant has raised a serious constitutional issue, and attempt to interpret the statute in a manner
designed to avoid the issue. Although these choices raise a number
of non-trivial issues—the Chevron doctrine being only one—as
government officers, the members of the TTAB should no longer
avoid their obligation to uphold the Constitution in their decisionmaking processes.
233

Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 202 (1994).
See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137
S. Ct. 30 (2016).
235
Id. at 1336
234

